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TOP SECRET: A CONSTITUTIONAL LOOK AT THE
PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS INHERENT IN
SEALING CIVIL COURT DOCUMENTS
INTRODUCTION
Americans are fascinated by celebrities, and judges are not immune
to that fascination. Senator John Kerry,' rock star Billy Corgan, 2 me-
dia moguls in the Hearst family, 3 and Hyatt Corporation entrepre-
neurs in the Pritzker family4 have all convinced a judge to seal
documents in their civil court proceedings.5 Yet, the judicial system
belongs to the people.6 Courts should not keep their doors (nor their
files) closed whenever the details are "titillating,"'7 only granting ac-
cess "when the facts are so boring that no one other than the parties
cares about them."8
The First Amendment, which ensures the freedoms of speech and of
the press, should protect access to judicial records. 9 Several courts
have recognized such protection. 10 Yet, the U.S. adversarial system
subordinates the public's constitutional right of access to the will of
the parties. 1 When an agreed order to seal a court file is presented,
1. Mystery of Kerry's Old Love, N.Y. POST, July 31, 2004, at 10.
2. Susan Chandler et al., Divorce Records Can Be a Minefield, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2004, at
Cl.
3. See Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
4. Susan Chandler, Unsealing of Pritzker Court Case is Rejected; Tribune to Appeal Judge's
Ruling, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 20, 2004, at C2.
5. More publicity has focused on recently sealed records in criminal trials. See John Gibeaut,
Celebrity Justice: The Rich and Famous Get Star Treatment, Creating the Appearance of a Two-
Tiered Court System, ABA J., Jan. 2005, at 43. For example, judicial documents in singer
Michael Jackson's prosecution for child molestation have been almost completely sealed. Id.
Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court ordered judicial documents in basketball star Kobe Bry-
ant's rape trial to remain sealed. Id. at 48.
6. See A.P. v. M.E.E., 821 N.E.2d 1238, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) ("[Tihe public has a right to
know who is utilizing the courts that its tax dollars support."). See also In re Krynicki, 983 F.2d
74, 75 (7th Cir. 1992) ("What happens in the halls of government is presumptively open to public
scrutiny. Judges deliberate in private but issue public decisions after public arguments based on
public records.").
7. Krynicki, 983 F.2d at 78.
8. Id
9. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
10. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
that summary judgment motions filed in a civil suit are protected by the First Amendment right
of access).
11. For example, when Chicago's famed Pritzker family sought approval of a settlement that
divided the family's fifteen billion dollar "empire," all parties to the case wanted the record
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advocates for the press and public are rarely in the courtroom to pro-
tect their right of access. 12
The Fourth Amendment, which protects the right to be free from
unlawful searches and seizures, presents a similar procedural prob-
lem 3-the state argues for a warrant, but the suspect affected by that
warrant is absent from the courtroom. When examining a warrant re-
quest, the judge has the solemn responsibility to consider the suspect's
liberty interests and the public's safety interests. The suspect and the
public are both absent from the proceeding. The judge is the only
person who can protect those rights and must carefully consider the
facts in light of the presumptions and narrow exceptions drawn by the
courts. By looking to the procedural protections employed in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, courts can develop a framework to pro-
tect the First Amendment right of access.
This Comment explores the right of access to "judicial docu-
ments" 14 and the procedural problems incident to that right. Part II
discusses the common law and First Amendment origins of the right
of access.' 5 Part III examines the use of Supreme Court precedent by
lower courts in expanding the right of access and argues in favor of
First Amendment protection of access to documents filed in civil
cases.16 Part III also critiques procedural barriers that prevent en-
forcement of the right of access and draws on Fourth Amendment
procedural jurisprudence to suggest a workable framework to protect
the access right. 17 Part IV considers the burden that proper protec-
tion of the right of access will place on the judiciary and evaluates
various solutions.' Part V concludes that a local rule that follows a
Fourth Amendment framework in governing access to judicial docu-
sealed. See Chandler, supra note 4. There was no representative to fight for the public's right to
access, and so the entire record was sealed. Id. The Chicago Tribune then intervened to fight for
the public's right of access, as well as its own, resulting in a published opinion by the Illinois
Appellate Court. See A.P., 821 N.E.2d at 1238 (reversing lower court's broad sealing order).
12. See, e.g., Dittrich v. Gibbs, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1570 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2002) (where the
intervening party, the Chicago Tribune, did not enter the picture until five years after the case
settled).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
14. Judicial documents, as used in this Comment, include anything filed with the court in
connection with a lawsuit. Materials exchanged in discovery do not qualify: "The presumption
of access does not apply until the documents or records of such proceedings are filed with the
court or are used at a judicial proceeding." NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d
337, 359 n.25 (Cal. 1999).
15. See infra notes 23-103 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 108-176 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 177-244 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 247-272 and accompanying text.
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ments is the best way to protect the First Amendment rights of the
press and the public.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
This section discusses the history of access to court documents. It
starts by examining the historical significance of the First Amendment
and then considers the Supreme Court origins of the First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials.20 It then considers how lower
courts have expanded this precedent to documents filed in criminal
proceedings, to civil trials, and to documents filed in civil trials. 2' The
section finishes with a review of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 22
A. The First Amendment's Place in History
Early Americans were wary of the newly established federal gov-
ernment. 23 This fear pervaded the drafting of the Constitution 24 and
led the first Congress to adopt the Bill of Rights, which further limited
federal power.25 Thus, Congress created the First Amendment, com-
manding, "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ",26
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amend-
ment broadly 27 and has granted the press wide latitude to serve as a
governmental "watchdog. '28 The Court has noted that "the First
19. See infra notes 273-276 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 23-74 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 89-103 and accompanying text.
23. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
46-47 (1991).
24. Id. at 47. Lewis refers to two primary constitutional safeguards: (1) the states' ability to
retain most powers while placing a few explicitly limited powers in the federal government (i.e.,
interstate commerce and foreign policy); and (2) separation of federal power into the legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. Id.
25. Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment, ratified in 1791, states in full: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id. First Amendment
rights are protected "against invasion" by the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 599 n.2 (1980) (Stewart, J., concurring) (citing
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925)).
27. The Supreme Court has "long eschewed any 'narrow, literal conception' of the Amend-
ment's terms." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982) (quoting
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 430 (1963)).
28. LARRY J. SABATO, FEEDING FRENZY: ATTACK JOURNALISM AND AMERICAN POLITICS 19
(2000). Labeling the modern press as "junkyard dogs" rather than "watchdogs," some critics
have criticized the media's overindulgence in these broad protections. Id.
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Amendment does not speak equivocally .... It must be taken as a
command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read in the
context of a liberty-loving society, will allow."' 29 First Amendment
protection applies "to the communication, to its source and to its re-
cipients both. ' 30 Hence, newsgathering is entitled to some First
Amendment protection. 31 Additionally, once the press has lawfully
obtained information, the First Amendment prohibits government
from preventing accurate publication of that information.32
B. The Supreme Court Leads the Way With
"Logic and Experience"
Against this history, the Supreme Court addressed the right of ac-
cess to judicial records. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., the
Court considered granting media access to tapes of President Nixon's
secretly recorded conversations regarding the Watergate scandal.33
The tapes were admitted into evidence in the criminal trial of the
President's former advisors.34 The Court acknowledged the common-
law "right to inspect and copy public records and documents, includ-
ing judicial records and documents" and the absence of precedent set-
ting the boundaries of that right.35 After a brief discussion of the
historical presumption of openness, 36 the Court declared that the
common-law right of access was "not absolute" and listed situations
where access may be denied.37 The Court quickly concluded "that the
decision as to access is one best left to the sound discretion of the trial
court .... -38 The respondent media companies raised the First
29. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941).
30. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756
(1976).
31. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972) (stating that "without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
32. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975) (holding that the press was free to
publish the name of a rape victim obtained from court records "in the public domain").
33. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 591 (1978).
34. Id. at 592.
35. Id. at 597.
36. The Court cited a litany of cases dating back to the late nineteenth century recognizing the
common-law right of access. Id. at 597-98. The Court recognized the English custom requiring
a private, proprietary interest in a document before access was granted. Id. at 597. In contrast,
American courts have justified access with public interests such as "keep[ing] a watchful eye on
the workings of public agencies" and publishing information regarding the operation of govern-
ment. Id. at 598.
37. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 598. Such situations, according to the Nixon Court, include use of court
files for improper purposes such as: (1) where there is "publication of 'the painful and sometimes
disgusting details of a divorce case"' (quoting In re Caswell, 29 A. 259 (R.I. 1893)); (2) where
publications contain libelous statements; and (3) where trade secrets are involved. Id.
38. Id. at 599.
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Amendment to further support their arguments for access. 39 The
Court did not fully address the issue, and instead held that the press
was not entitled to any greater right of access than the general public
and that the general "public never had physical access" to the tapes.4 0
By permitting the Presidential Recordings Act4 1 to rule the day,42 the
Court ultimately avoided the common-law access task of "weighing
the interests advanced by the parties in light of the public interest and
the duty of the courts. '4 3
Two years later the Court decided the "watershed case" 44 of Rich-
mond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.45 In Richmond Newspapers, the
Court considered the legality of closing a criminal trial by agreement
of the parties and the press's constitutional right to challenge the clo-
sure.46 The Court found that the public, including the press, must first
be entitled to attend trials before they are able to exercise the First
Amendment freedom to discuss them. 47 Therefore, "the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit
government from summarily closing courtroom doors which had long
been open to the public at the time that Amendment was adopted. '4 8
This was the first time the Court "squarely held" that the media has a
39. Id. at 608.
40. Id. at 609. Some commentators have recognized the Court's language as an explicit rejec-
tion of the First Amendment right of public access to judicial records. William Ollie Key, Jr.,
The Common Law Right to Inspect and Copy Judicial Records: In Camera or On Camera, 16 GA.
L. REV. 659, 670 (1982). This author, and later courts, read Warner more broadly-simply refut-
ing the press's superior position over the public. See, e.g., In re Continental I11. Sec. Litigation,
732 F.2d 1302, 1309 n.ll (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that "the only 'right' denied in Warner Commu-
nications was to make copies of the audio tapes; no general denial of the right of access was
implicated by the Supreme Court's disposition of that case").
41. The full title of the statute is the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act
(Act). Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 429 (1977). The Court explained that the
Act
directs the Administrator of General Services ... to take custody of the Presidential
papers and tape recordings of appellant, former President Richard M. Nixon, and pro-
mulgate regulations that (1) provide for the orderly processing and screening by Execu-
tive Branch archivists of such materials for the purpose of returning to appellant those
that are personal and private in nature, and (2) determine the terms and conditions
upon which public access may eventually be had to those materials that are retained.
Id. After a thorough discussion of the Act, the Court found it constitutional. See id. at 462.
42. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 605-06. The unique circumstances of this case-the materials at issue
were recorded by President Nixon-permitted application of the Act.
43. Id. at 602.
44. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
45. Id. at 555 (majority opinion).
46. The accused solicited the closed proceedings. Id. at 559-60. If a defendant insists upon an
open criminal trial, the Sixth Amendment provides the remedy. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443
U.S. 368 (1979).
47. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76.
48. Id. at 576.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
constitutional right of access to judicial proceedings. 49 Justice William
Brennan provided a two-part framework for future application of the
plurality's newly articulated protections. 50 His concurrence first ex-
amined the history of the right of access, reasoning that "a tradition of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience." 5' The
second part considered the modern-day practical importance of the
right-"whether access to a particular government process is impor-
tant in terms of that very process. '52 Justice Brennan's concurrence
subsequently became "the actual touchstone for the new doctrine of
access . . . .53
It was not long before Justice Brennan applied his framework while
writing for the Court.54 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court in-
volved the constitutionality of a Massachusetts law that required ex-
clusion of the press and the public from a courtroom when testimony
was given by a sexual assault victim under the age of eighteen.55 De-
spite the willingness of all parties (including the three minor rape vic-
tims whose testimony was forthcoming) to permit the courtroom to
remain open, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed. 56
Justice Brennan launched into his analysis by considerating the his-
torical presumption of access to criminal trials.57 Referring to a simi-
lar historical analysis performed in In re Oliver,58 Brennan noted that
the presumption is "so solidly grounded that the [Oliver] Court was
'unable to find a single instance of a criminal trial conducted in cam-
era in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this
country."' 59 Turning from the role of the right of access in criminal
trials to the "functioning of the judicial process and the government as
a whole," the Globe Court listed the benefits of access.60 Foremost
49. Id. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 584, 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 589.
52. Id.
53. Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 273 (1995). The Second Circuit recently used
Brennan's "logic" and "experience" test to justify a First Amendment right of access to docket
sheets. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 94, 95 (2d Cir. 2004). The court found
"logic" in the familiar tenets of judicial integrity and procedural fairness. Id. at 95. For "experi-
ence," the court turned early to nineteenth-century publications, such as dictionaries, to find that
the purpose of docket sheets was to put people on notice. Id. at 94-95.
54. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
55. Id. at 598.
56. Id. at 599.
57. Id. at 605.
58. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
59. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 (quoting Oliver, 333 U.S. at 266).
60. Id. at 606.
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among those benefits were safeguarding the "integrity of the fact find-
ing process," "foster[ing] an appearance of fairness," and permitting
the public to "serve as a check upon the judicial process .... ,,66 The
Court held that access to criminal trials passed both prongs of Justice
Brennan's test, as it was grounded in both "logic and experience. '62
Therefore, the Court granted a right of access grounded in the First
Amendment.63
The Court found pretrial hearings "sufficiently like a trial to justify
the" extension of First Amendment protection in Press-Enterprise Co.
v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1/).64 Because the public's ability
to attend such hearings assured "that established procedures are being
followed and that deviations will become known, '65 the "logic" test
was satisfied. 66 The Court also found evidence of open preliminary
hearings throughout the nineteenth century, and relied on this history
to satisfy the "experience" test.67 Yet, the broad historical review
characteristic of previous cases68 was replaced with a nineteenth-cen-
tury inquiry "[i]gnoring historical evidence of closed pretrial proceed-
ings under English law and at the time of the adoption of the First
Amendment. '69  The Press-Enterprise II Court noted that other
sources found a less compelling history of openness but decided that
"given the importance of the pretrial proceeding to the criminal trial,
the traditional right of access should still apply. ' 70 Thus, the Court
applied a "qualified First Amendment right of access" to preliminary
hearings in criminal proceedings. 71
The Press-Enterprise II Court further recognized that because the
right was grounded in the First Amendment, the proceedings could
only be closed if the reason for closure satisfied strict scrutiny. 72 Ap-
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 610-11.
64. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
65. Id. at 13 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S.
501, 508 (1984)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 10-11.
68. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 565-69 (1980) (tracing the
history of open criminal pioceedings from the "days before the Norman Conquest" through
Colonial America).
69. NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 357 (Cal. 1999) (citing Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 387-89 (1979)).
70. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 10 n.3.
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id. at 13-14 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S.
501, 510 (1984), as stating that "closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest").
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plying that concept to the interest of the accused in a fair trial, the
Court found that a preliminary hearing could only be closed if "spe-
cific findings [were] made demonstrating that, first, there [was] a sub-
stantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial [would] be
prejudiced by publicity that closure would prevent and, second, rea-
sonable alternatives to closure [could not] adequately protect the de-
fendant's fair trial rights. ' 73 The Court unanimously reaffirmed the
holdings of Press-Enterprise II in a 1993 case involving similar issues,74
but has not subsequently revisited the issue.
C. Lower Courts Follow the Lead
The Supreme Court has not taken the First Amendment right of
access beyond Press-Enterprise 11.75 But, that has not stopped federal
and state courts from expanding that right. 76 The first step beyond
Press Enterprise H was the Ninth Circuit's holding in Associated Press
v. United States District Court that the right of access applied to docu-
ments filed in a criminal proceeding. 77 Referring to the First Amend-
ment right of access, the court stated that "[t]here is no reason to
distinguish between [criminal] pretrial proceedings and the documents
filed in regard to them. 78
The First Circuit more recently applied the First Amendment to
protect access to judicial documents filed in criminal proceedings in In
re Providence Journal.79 Facing "intense" publicity in the criminal
trial of the Mayor of Providence, a Rhode Island District Court sealed
73. Id. at 14. The Second Circuit recently relied, in part, on a district court's failure to estab-
lish this "substantial probability" in reversing a decision to close voir dire proceedings in the
famed Martha Stewart case. ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2004).
74. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1993). The case involved
a challenge to a Puerto Rico law providing that a criminal defendant's preliminary hearing
"'shall be held privately' unless the defendant requests otherwise." Id. at 148 (quoting 34 P.R.
LAws ANN. R. 23(C) (1991)). A reporter for the Commonwealth's largest paper brought suit to
challenge the law. Id. The Court struck down the law as "irreconcilable with Press Enterprise"
H. Id. at 149.
75. United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) ("There is not yet any defini-
tive Supreme Court ruling on whether there is a constitutional right of access to court documents
and, if so, the scope of such a right.").
76. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding
summary judgment motions filed in civil suit are protected by the First Amendment right of
access).
77. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983); see also In re
New York Times Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) (recognizing qualified First Amendment right
of access to written motion papers but remanding for more "specific findings" regarding neces-
sity of sealing order).
78. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
79. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
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all filings.80 The First Circuit reversed, finding that the lower court's
"standard practice of refusing to place memoranda submitted in con-
junction with motions on file in the clerk's office when tendered-
violates the First Amendment. 81
The Sixth Circuit was the earliest circuit to find that a First Amend-
ment right of access applied to judicial documents in civil proceed-
ings.82 In Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) filed documents that showed tar and nico-
tine levels contained in certain cigarettes. 83 Those documents were
subsequently sealed.84 A not-for-profit consumer organization inter-
vened, requesting public access to the FTC filings. 85 The Sixth Circuit
considered the Supreme Court's Richmond Newspapers and Globe
Newspaper decisions and found the Court's reasoning applicable to
civil cases.86 The court recognized that "[t]he resolution of private
disputes frequently involves issues and remedies affecting third parties
or the general public .... Civil cases frequently involve issues crucial
to the public-for example, discrimination, voting rights, antitrust is-
sues, government regulation, bankruptcy, etc."' 87 Other courts have
similarly recognized a First Amendment right of access to civil judicial
documents.88
D. Fourth Amendment 1listory
Because this Comment draws on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
to develop a framework for protecting the public's access to judicial
documents, a brief discussion of Fourth Amendment history is re-
quired. The Fourth Amendment provides the right to be free from
"unreasonable searches and seizures. '8 9 The Amendment was passed
80. Id. at 5.
81. Id. at 13.
82. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1983).
83. Id. at 1168.
84. Id. at 1169.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1178-79.
87. Id. at 1179.
88. Spe e.-., Rushford . N.w Yorker ,agaz-, Inc., 846 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1988) flind-
summary judgment motions filed in a civil suit enjoy First Amendment right of access). See also
In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2002) (recognizing the First Amendment
right of access to legal memoranda filed in connection with criminal proceedings, but explicitly
making its holding applicable to civil cases).
89. In full, the Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2006] 1075
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amid concern by colonists of the dangers of warrant abuse.90 The
Fourth Amendment developed into a presumption that "searches con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated ex-
ceptions." 91 "Prior approval" requires the state to give details about
the place to be searched and items to be seized. 92 Further, the state
must persuade the judge or magistrate that probable cause exists.93
Additionally, "the courts must also insist that the magistrate ... 'per-
form his neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rub-
ber stamp for the police."' 94
There are several narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement:
the search incident to lawful custodial arrest exception, 95 the automo-
bile exception,96 the exigent circumstances exception, 97 the stop and
frisk exception, 98 the plain view exception, 99 and the consent excep-
tion.100 To challenge a Fourth Amendment violation, one must have
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
90. One scholar summarized: "There are other essential rights, which we have justly under-
stood to be the rights of free men, as freedom from hasty and unreasonable search warrants.
warrants not founded on oath, and not issued with due caution for searching and seizing men's
papers, property, and persons." ROBERT M. BLOOM, SEARCHES, SEIZURES, AND WARRANTS: A
REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 11 (2003) (citing The Federal Farmer
No. 4, Oct. 12, 1787).
91. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
92. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987) ("The manifest purpose of this particularity
requirement was to prevent general searches.").
93. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) ("Probable cause exists where the
'facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in
the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed.") (quoting Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S.
132, 162 (1925)).
94. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
111 (1964)) (some internal quotation marks omitted).
95. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 (1969) (noting that when police arrest a
suspect, they may search the area within the arrestee's immediate control without a warrant).
96. See, e.g., Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (holding that automobiles may be searched without a war-
rant provided there is probable cause to believe that the car contains contraband).
97. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (holding that "the exigencies of the
situation" permitted search of a house without a warrant where officers were in pursuit of an
armed robber).
98. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that an officer may constitutionally
"pat down" an individual whom he has reasonable suspicion "is armed and presently dangerous
to the officer or to others").
99. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (recognizing the right of of-
ficers to seize evidence without a warrant when that evidence is within the officer's "plain
view").
100. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (recognizing that "one of
the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause
is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent").
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standing.10 1 Assuming the standing requirement is satisfied and a
Fourth Amendment violation exists, unlawfully seized evidence may
be barred under the exclusionary rule'0 2 or the under doctrine of
"fruit of the poisonous tree.110 3
III. ANALYSIS
This Part examines the justifications that courts use to expand the
First Amendment right of access beyond Supreme Court precedent.
It explores the growth of the right of access from criminal proceedings
to documents filed incident to criminal proceedings, then to civil pro-
ceedings, and finally to documents filed incident to civil proceed-
ings. 104 It also addresses the primary concerns of expansion into the
civil arena.'0 5 Further, this Part examines the inherent procedural
limits on effective protection of the public's right to access.' 0 6 It sug-
gests using the Fourth Amendment's procedural framework as a guide
to preserve the rights of the press and the public. 10 7
A. Expansion of the First Amendment Right of Access
The expansion of the First Amendment right of access has been a
logical one. The Supreme Court started by granting a First Amend-
ment right of access to criminal trials. 0 8 The Court justified this right
by explaining that an open trial assures that "the proceedings were
conducted fairly to all," that it serves as a check on judicial power,
that an open trial builds confidence in the judicial process, that it pro-
vides significant community "therapeutic value,"' 0 9 and that open tri-
als prevent "some form of vengeful 'self-help."" t10 The Court used
those reasons and "logic and experience," as further developed in
101. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85 (1980) (holding that "defendants charged with
crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth
Amendment rights have in fact been violated").
102. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) ("We hold that all evidence obtained by
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
state court.").
103. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963) (holding that the fruits of ille-
gally seized evidence are inadmissible).
104. See infra notes 108-152 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 153-176 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 177-191 and accompanying text.
107. See infra notes 192-244 and accompanying text.
108. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
109. Id. at 569.
110. Id. at 571.
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Globe Newspapers, to extend the right of access to pretrial
proceedings.i"'
Significantly, the "tradition" prong has taken a back seat. While the
Richmond Newspapers Court surveyed the history of open trials from
"before the Norman Conquest, 1 12 the Press-Enterprise II Court lim-
ited its historical inquiry into pretrial proceedings to the nineteenth
century-starting the inquiry where it first found an open pretrial pro-
ceeding.11 3 Because the Court had also reviewed a lengthier history in
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,114 the Press Enterprise II Court knew that
starting the inquiry a few years earlier would reveal a history of closed
pretrial proceedings. This selective historical analysis reveals the
weakness of the "tradition" test-courts are able to suit their purpose
by analyzing the appropriate historical era.115
Advances in technology have further weakened the "tradition"
prong. For example, the propriety of televised trials finds no appro-
priate historical analogy.'1 6 Faced with such problems, courts side-
step the "tradition" analysis by drawing analogies to documents or
proceedings of the same "type or kind." 117 For example, the First Cir-
cuit recently noted "the absence of analogous tradition might not
doom a claim where the functional argument for access to a type of
judicial document is strong .. ".a118
The Court's broadly applicable "logic" justifications and its reduced
emphasis on the "tradition" test have opened the door for the expan-
sion of a First Amendment access right. Lower courts have taken full
advantage, and the Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to set
the boundaries. 119
111. Id. at 581. The Court held: "The considerations that led the Court to apply the First
Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond Newspapers and Globe and the selec-
tion of jurors in Press Enterprise I lead us to conclude that the right of access applies to prelimi-
nary hearings as conducted in California." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-
Enterprise 11), 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
112. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 565.
113. Press-Enterprise If, 478 U.S. at 10-11.
114. The Gannett Court explained: "Under English common law, the public had no right to
attend pretrial proceedings." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 389 (1979) (citing ED-
WARD JENKS, THE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 75 (6th ed. 1967)).
115. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10 (finding historical right of access to pretrial pro-
ceedings by examining nineteenth-century procedure); contra Gannett, 443 U.S. at 389 (finding
no historical right of access to pretrial proceedings by starting a few years earlier).
116. See generally Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
117. In re Boston Herald, Inc., 321 F.3d 174, 184 (1st Cir. 2003).
118. Id. at 184 n.5.
119. See United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806, 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting that "[t]here is
not yet any definitive Supreme Court ruling on whether there is a constitutional right of access
to court documents and, if so, the scope of such a right").
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1. From Criminal Proceedings to Judicial Documents Filed in those
Proceedings
Even before the Court decided Press-Enterprise H, several circuits
had recognized a First Amendment right of access to documents filed
in criminal proceedings.1 20 For example, in a 1983 decision, the Ninth
Circuit found "no reason to distinguish between pretrial proceedings
and the documents filed in regard to them."' 121 The court drew specifi-
cally from Justice Brennan's two-part test, previously articulated in
Globe Newspapers: "[T]he two principal justifications for the first
amendment right of access to criminal proceedings apply, in general,
to pretrial documents." 122 The Ninth Circuit recognized that pretrial
documents "are often important to a full understanding of the way in
which 'the judicial process and the government as a whole' are func-
tioning. ' 12 3 The trend continued after the Court decided Press-Enter-
prise II, as the other circuits followed suit. 124
For example, in In re Providence Journal Co., the Mayor of Provi-
dence was indicted "with five other[s]-on a variety of charges. ' 125
Included in the indictment was a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) conspiracy count that "charged the defendants
with operating City Hall as a racketeering enterprise that demanded
bribes.., as a prerequisite to doing business with the municipality and
its agencies. 1 26 The indictment and trial resulted in "intense" public-
ity.1 27 Attempting to ensure a fair trial, the court ordered legal memo-
randa filed in camera, and indicated that if it deemed dissemination
appropriate, it would order the document to be released to the
clerk. 28 The First Circuit found that this "blanket nonfiling policy-
[the] standard practice of refusing to place memoranda submitted in
120. See, e.g., In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (recognizing right of
access to documents filed in connection with bail proceeding). See also Associated Press v.
United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (recognizing right to documents filed
in pretrial proceedings).
121. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145. The case involved the indictment of John DeLorean
(creator of the gull wing sports car in the Back to the Future movies) on federal narcotics
charges. Id. at 1144. The case received widespread media attention. Id. Two months after the
case started, the district court ordered all future documents filed under seaL Th e order was
made sua sponte. Id.
122. Id. at 1145.
123. Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
124. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 502 (1st Cir. 1989).
125. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2002).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 5-6.
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conjunction with motions on file in the clerk's office when tendered-
violate[d] the First Amendment."' 29
Given the overwhelming support of such an expansion, the First
Amendment right to access judicial documents filed in criminal pro-
ceedings is relatively well settled, though the U.S. Supreme Court has
not so ruled. Courts making this extension rely on the same reasoning
that justified granting a First Amendment right to open criminal pro-
ceedings-fairness, confidence, and judicial propriety. 130 If the pro-
ceedings are open, the documents on which they are based should be
open. 131 While the First Amendment right is not absolute and while
certain documents may be constitutionally sealed,' 32 the general prin-
ciple is justified: an open courtroom results in an open file.
2. Extending the First Amendment Right of Access to Civil
Proceedings
In determining the propriety of access to civil documents, it is logi-
cal to begin with civil proceedings. In the criminal arena, the First
Amendment right of access to trials has been used to justify a right of
access to documents filed in connection with those proceedings. 133 If
an analogous extension applies, an open civil courtroom will lead to
an open civil file (with relevant exceptions).
a. If a Right of Access Attaches to Criminal Proceedings, Civil
Proceedings Should Also Be Open
The Supreme Court has noted in dicta that because the advantages
of public criminal trials similarly apply in the civil context, "there is no
principled basis upon which a public right of access to judicial pro-
ceedings can be limited to criminal cases .... ",134 Curiously, even in
Richmond Newspapers, the seminal case granting a First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials, the Court "note[d] that historically
both civil and criminal trials have been presumptively open. '135
129. Id. at 12-13.
130. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569-72 (1980).
131. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983)
(recognizing right of access to documents filed in pretrial proceedings).
132. Providence Journal, 293 F.3d at 13.
133. See Associated Press, 705 F.2d at 1145.
134. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386-87 n.15 (1979). The Gannett Court used
the analogy to explain that relying on history to grant a Sixth Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings "proves too much." Id. Subsequent decisions relied on that same history
to grant a First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper
Co. v. Superior Court. 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555.
135. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580 n.17.
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The parallel to criminal trials is compelling. Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation is just one of the landmark civil trials that shaped the social
policy of the United States.136 The Massachusetts trial that involved a
chemical company that allegedly poisoned a town's well water was
detailed in A Civil Action, the well-known book written by Jonathan
Harr. t37 Keeping the public from such proceedings would encourage
quiet settlements and stifle societal progress. 138 Civil cases can have
implications far beyond those for the parties involved: "In fact, mis-
takes in civil proceedings may be more likely to inflict costs upon third
parties, therefore meriting even more scrutiny."1 39
For example, in considering whether a First Amendment right exists
to televise civil trials, the Second Circuit endorsed a First Amendment
right of access to civil trials. 140 The underlying case examined
"whether the high United States military command in Vietnam will-
fully distorted intelligence data to substantive optimistic reports on
the progress of the war," an issue of "considerable" national impor-
tance. 141 Relying on the Supreme Court's decisions in Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper, the court stated that
public access to civil trials "enhances the quality and safeguards the
integrity of the factfinding process, fosters an appearance of fair-
ness," and heightens "public respect for the judicial process" while
permitting "the public to participate in and serve as a check upon
the judicial process-an essential component in our structure of self
government. " 14 2
136. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (rejecting the contention that segregated schools were separate but
equal). The Gannett Court recognized this principle by noting "[wihile the operation of the
judicial process in civil cases is often of interest only to the parties in the litigation, this is not
always the case." Gannett, 443 U.S. at 386-87 n.15 (citing Brown, 347 U.S. 483, and Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)).
137. See generally JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995); see also Anderson v. W.R.
Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986).
138. In fact, the propriety of sealing private settlements is a recurring issue in the arena of
access to court documents. For a thorough treatment of the issue, see Anne-Therese Bechamps,
Sealed Out-Of-Court Settlements: When Does the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 117, 117 (1990). See also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Schumacher, 392
N.W.2d 197 (Minn. 1986). In Schumacher, the parties in the underlying suit reached a settlement
agreement after a plane crash. Id. at 200. State law required that the settlement be approved by
the court because it was a wrongful death case. 1d. at 200 u.1. Inc innesota Supreme Cour
ultimately accepted the litigants' argument that sealing the settlement was necessary to protect
the families of the crash victims from dangers such as exploitation and theft. Id. at 200. The trial
court restricted its sealing order to the settlement documents, amending its previous order to
seal the entire file. Id. at 201-02 n.3.
139. Grove Fresh Distrib., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994).
140. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984).
141. Id. at 18.




While explicitly recognizing the First Amendment right to attend civil
trials, the court declined to extend that right to the television
screen.143
The presumption of open civil proceedings applies even when there
is less potential for public impact-"the public has an interest, in all
civil cases, in observing and assessing the performance of its public
judicial system .... ,,144 For example, a federal district court denied
defendant's motion (unopposed by plaintiff) to hold in camera pro-
ceedings regarding the alleged wrongful removal of the parties' child
from Israel.145 The court recognized that "[e]xcept in rare instances, it
is the right of every American to see the public's business conducted
in an open forum where the demeanor, conduct and speech of all par-
ticipants-the judge and jury-the lawyers-the witnesses can be ob-
served and evaluated.' 46 Thus, the court denied the defendant's
motion because she did not show that disclosure of the information
would "threaten national security[,] place an individual in grave physi-
cal danger," or satisfy some other compelling interest. 47
In considering the right of access to a civil trial involving a dispute
between two celebrities, the California Supreme Court noted that
"[n]o case to which we have been cited or of which we are aware sug-
gests, much less holds, that the First Amendment right of access as
articulated by the high court does not apply, as a general matter, to
ordinary civil proceedings. ' 148 Thus, the court held that the First
Amendment provides a right of access to "ordinary" civil trials.t 49
The analogy between civil and criminal proceedings is sound. If the
justification for access to criminal proceedings lies in the benefits of
public exposure to the judicial process to ensure truthfulness, fairness,
and judicial propriety, 150 open civil proceedings are equally justified.
As demonstrated by Westmoreland v. Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. ,15 the public interest in a civil case may present broader implica-
tions than a murder trial, as was the issue in Richmond Newspapers.152
Even if no such compelling societal interest exists, the procedural jus-
143. Id.
144. NBC Subsidiary, Inc. v. Superior Court, 980 P.2d 337, 360 (Cal. 1999).
145. Dorsman v. Glazer, No. 03-22861-CIV-KING, 2004 WL 1368866, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar.
10, 2004).
146. Id.
147. Id. at *2.
148. NBC Subsidiary, 980 P.2d at 358-59.
149. Id.
150. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
151. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1984).
152. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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tifications of truthfulness, fairness, and judicial propriety are no less
important. The judiciary functions as a branch of government, and a
democracy can only function if voters can see their government work.
b. Privacy Concerns in Civil Cases
While the reasons for access to criminal proceedings are equally ap-
plicable to civil proceedings, it is important to consider whether there
are any special characteristics of civil proceedings that weigh against
access. After all, the public is a party in every criminal case, 53 but
may have no significant interest in a private civil case.
Privacy is the counter-balance to the access argument. The Su-
preme Court has recognized a constitutional right to privacy. 154 Cer-
tainly, the defendant in a criminal proceeding has just as much of a
privacy interest as do the parties in civil litigation. 55 Because so much
is at stake in a criminal trial-when one's life and liberty are on the
line-the courts require that the criminal judicial process be an open
one regardless of a defendant's desire for privacy. 156 The question
then becomes, if there is less at stake in a civil proceeding (e.g.,
money), is the public's justification for knowing more easily out-
weighed by the privacy interests of the parties?
Such an inquiry assumes there is a balance to be drawn: if the stakes
are high enough (such that the public should know what is happen-
ing), courts will grant access. Yet, this considers the access right from
the party's point of view-maybe a criminal defendant will want pub-
lic access in a high stakes murder trial but try to avoid it for a misde-
meanor drug possession charge. No such consideration takes place.
The press and the public have the right of access to criminal proceed-
ings regardless of the stakes or the defendant's preference. 157 Thus,
the weight of the potential consequence for a criminal defendant is
not a factor in access decisions. If the right to public access outweighs
privacy concerns in small and large criminal matters alike, the same
153. NBC Subsidiary, 980 P.2d at 360.
154. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that the "specific guarantees
in the Bill of Rights have penumbras" that protect "zones of privacy").
155. Arguably, a criminal defendant ha- a stronger prva-y i terest because .his or her only
options are to defend the suit (with the attendant public exposure) or accept a plea bargain,
which will also be of public record. In civil litigation, the plaintiff chooses to resolve the case in a
public forum-court. The civil defendant, often without that choice, still has an option to avoid
public exposure-a settlement.
156. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605-06 (1982).
157. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 555 (granting the First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings over defendant's objection). The defendant's personal right to an open




result should obtain when the consequence is only money (whether
the amount is large or small).
Further, the privacy argument is unjustified because "[l]itigants cer-
tainly anticipate, upon submitting their disputes for resolution in a
public court, before a state-appointed or publicly elected judge, that
the proceedings in their case will be adjudicated in public."1u 8 Civil
litigants know that by requesting a court's power to accomplish pri-
vate ends, the matter in dispute will be litigated in a public building,
supported by public funds, and staffed by public employees. Such liti-
gants "take the good with the bad, knowing that with public protec-
tion comes public knowledge" of otherwise private facts. 159
c. Extending the First Amendment Right of Access to Documents
Filed in Civil Proceedings
The Supreme Court extended the First Amendment right of access
from criminal trials to criminal pretrial proceedings. 160 Lower courts
found that documents filed in connection with those proceedings are
essential to understand the proceedings and extended the right of ac-
cess to those documents.1 61 Holding that the Supreme Court's justifi-
cations for open criminal proceedings applied to civil proceedings,
lower courts extended the First Amendment right of access to civil
proceedings. 162 The clear import of this pattern is the extension of the
First Amendment right of access to documents filed in connection
with civil proceedings. If documents filed in criminal proceedings-
open by virtue of the First Amendment-are constitutionally accessi-
ble, then documents filed in civil proceedings should also be constitu-
tionally accessible.
Several courts have so held. In recognizing the First Amendment
right of access to legal memoranda filed in connection with criminal
proceedings, the Providence Journal court explicitly made its holding
applicable to civil cases.' 63 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit found a First
Amendment right of access to summary judgment pleadings filed in a
civil case.164 In that case, the trial court sealed the pleadings because
the allegedly defamatory statements that formed the basis for the liti-
158. NBC Subsidiary, 980 P.2d at 360.
159. Estate of Hearst, 136 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977).
160. Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 11), 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
161. See Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983) (rec-
ognizing a right to documents filed in pretrial proceedings).
162. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984) (endorsing
First Amendment right of access to civil trials).
163. In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 13 n.5 (1st Cir. 2002).
164. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
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gation were contained in the documents.165 Citing precedent granting
a First Amendment right of access to documents filed in connection
with criminal proceedings and recognizing the logical extension to the
civil arena, the Fourth Circuit reversed. 166
More recently, the Second Circuit traced the First Amendment
right of access to judicial documents filed in civil proceedings and ex-
tended that right to civil docket sheets. 167 The court justified the right
under two theories. First, noting the First Amendment right of the
press and the public to attend civil and criminal trials, the court found
that the right "would be merely theoretical if the information pro-
vided by docket sheets were inaccessible. ' 168 Second, the court pro-
ceeded to analyze civil docket sheets under the "logic" and
"experience" tests as articulated in Press-Enterprise 1.169 Drawing on
sources such as nineteenth-century dictionaries and colonial statutes,
the court found sufficient historical access to satisfy the "tradition"
prong.170 Examining the "logic" prong, the court relied on the famil-
iar justifications for an open court system: fairness, confidence, and
judicial propriety. 17' Thus, the court held that "docket sheets enjoy a
presumption of openness and that the public and the media possess a
qualified First Amendment right to inspect them.' t 72
Wary of crossing the civil divide without more Supreme Court gui-
dance, some courts have refused to move beyond the criminal arena.
For example, as a D.C. Circuit Court Judge, Antonin Scalia rejected
the First Amendment right of access when considering restrictions on
media access (until after trial) to documents used in the summary
judgment proceedings of a civil suit.173 The court considered and then
dismissed the existence of a tradition of prejudgment access to records
165. Id. at 251.
166. Id. at 253.
167. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2004).
168. Id. at 93.
169. Id. at 94-96.
170. Id. For example, the court cited "Tomlins's Law Dictionary of 1809," which described a
docket as follows: "[w]hen rolls of judgments are brought into C.B. [Common Bench] they are
docketed, and entered on the docket of that term; so that upon any occasion you may soon find
out a judgment, by scaiching ihese dockets, if you know the attorney's name." Id. at 94 (quoting
SIR THOMAS E. TOMLINS, THE LAW DICrIONARY (2d ed. 1809)) (alterations in original).
171. Id. The court emphasized an often forgotten justification for opening judicial proceed-
ings-public education. Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 95. By permitting the public to see the
inner workings of the judiciary, the public has an "opportunity both for understanding the sys-
tem in general and its working in a particular case." Id. (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572 (1980)).
172. Id. at 96.
173. In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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in civil cases. 174 Judge Scalia was unable to find sufficient historical
basis for extending the right to civil cases. 75
Yet, for courts that found the extension wise, it was relatively
unenforced because the justifications for the Supreme Court's original
cases granting access to criminal proceedings are equally applicable to
civil documents. Dicta in those original decisions even suggest that
civil trials deserve the same rights protected in the Court's seminal
criminal access cases. 176 This, combined with a continued expansion
of the First Amendment right of access and the lack of any Supreme
Court precedent to quell that expansion, suggests the lower courts'
expansion of the doctrine is correct.
B. Protecting the First Amendment Right of Access: Procedural
Problems Inherent in an Adversarial System
Despite the existence of a First Amendment right to judicial docu-
ments filed in civil proceedings, enforcing that right remains a prob-
lem. If the government attempts to enjoin publication of a story
involving confidential government documents, the press can immedi-
ately challenge the attempt as a prior restraint. 177 Fundamentally, the
challenge is possible because the press knows the case exists. As in
New York Times v. United States (the "Pentagon Papers" case), the
press has every opportunity to assert its First Amendment rights by
virtue of being affected by the prior restraint. 178 But, the media do
not always have the benefit of notice. For example, Bruce Springsteen
was performing with his "E Street Band" in Hartford, Connecticut
when his saxophonist, Clarence Clemons, was served with papers re-
lating to a paternity suit. 179 Clemons requested that the record be
sealed, and the other party did not object.180 The media were not no-
tified, so they were not able to object. 181 As a result, "[a]ll traces of
the paternity case vanished from the public record. It was listed on no
docket; clerks denied it existed."'1 82
174. Id. at 1336.
175. Id.
176. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
177. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to enjoin
publication of the "Pentagon Papers," a classified forty-seven volume government report on the
war in Vietnam).
178. See id.
179. Eric Rich & Dave Altimari, Elite Enjoy 'Secret File' Lawsuits, HARTFORD COURANT,
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Often, it is in the interests of civil litigants to seal the record. One
party may have sensitive information that it prefers to keep from pub-
lic scrutiny. The other party is not harmed by the sealed record be-
cause it is permitted access to the file. 83 Further, by agreeing not to
oppose a sealing order, the latter party gains a bargaining chip to be
played later. Thus, many times the parties present an agreed order to
the court. No one raises First Amendment concerns, no one chal-
lenges the court's authority, and the record is sealed.184
Assuming the press is aware of the case's existence 85 and if the case
has a sufficiently high profile, the press may intervene. At this point,
the First Amendment rights of the press and of the public are brought
to the court's attention. 186 Yet, this post hoc recognition of those
rights presents its own problems. The media are forced to take on the
burden and expense of enforcing the public's First Amendment
rights.187 The ensuing battle means more work for the parties, the
183. In fact, the right of access does not extend to material unveiled in pretrial discovery.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984). The right of access only attaches when
this information is filed with the court in connection with a motion or for other reasons. See, e.g.,
Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir. 1988).
184. At least one author has suggested that "plain old-fashioned ignorance" may explain an
unchallenged court's willingness to seal a record. See Gibeaut, supra note 5. Gibeaut quotes
Lacy Dalglish, director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, who teaches
judges about the First Amendment right of access at the National Judicial College and "other
training seminars for judges." Id. Dalglish reports that some judges "are honest-to-God sur-
prised to find out that the First Amendment applies in this situation." Id.
185. See Rich & Altimari, supra note 179.
186. Chicago's famed Pritzker Family, owners of the Hyatt Corporation, convinced the Circuit
Court of Cook County to seal the record in a case involving the disbursement of that family's
fifteen billion dollar empire. See Chandler, supra note 4. The Chicago Tribune intervened, rais-
ing First Amendment access issues, but the sitting judge denied its motion to unseal the record.
Id. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed, finding that "the trial court merely acquiesced with
the parties' requests to file all their pleadings and documents under seal." A.P. v. M.E.E., 821
N.E.2d 1238, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). Ultimately, the court relied on the common-law pre-
sumption of access rather than the First Amendment because it found insufficient evidence of
historical access to settlement agreements. Id. at 1251.
187. The Chicago Tribune has fought to enforce the right of access to court documents in
several high profile cases in addition to the breakup of the Pritzker family fortune. See Chan-
dler, supra note 4. It succeeded in unsealing U.S. Senatorial candidate Jack Ryan's divorce pa-
pers. See Chandler et al., supra note 2. Ryan subsequently withdrew from the Senate race, only
to be replaced by Alan Keyes-who previously had no ties to th s . See Liam Ford & John
Chase, Keyes Guarantees Fight, if Not Victory, CHi. TRIB., Aug. 9, 2004, at CN1. The devastation
suffered by Ryan because of the delayed release of the information contained in the papers only
proves the point of this Comment. The work needs to be done in advance so as to avoid undue
reliance by the parties. Ryan thought he was protected. He told the Republican party leader-
ship and the public that there was nothing scandalous in the sealed papers. See Liam Ford &
Rudolph Bush, Ryan Quits Race; State GOP Scrambles to Find Replacement to Face Obama,
CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2004, at Cl. He paid for that misstatement because when the court took a
close look at the record, it found that the public was entitled to access the documents. Id. The
backlash forced him out of the race. Id. Arguably, had the court made these findings when a
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press, and the court. The battle may be unnecessarily complicated by
other factors-courts sometimes seal the order that seals the file.188
Further, the media are harmed by the delay. Because newsworthiness
is subject to timeliness, "[t]o delay or postpone disclosure undermines
the benefit of public scrutiny and may have the same result as com-
plete suppression."'1 89 The First Amendment right of access is frus-
trated by a delay of weeks or months' 90 while the courts examine the
rights of the press, the public, and the parties.
The parties that initially benefit from a broad sealing order are not
left unscathed. If the press intervenes, the parties face legal bills that
result from defending the right to seal against the presumption of
openness guaranteed by the First Amendment. This defense may be-
come all the more essential if the parties relied on that sealing order
to file documents that contain sensitive information. Unsealing such a
file can cause the parties significant harm.' 91 A system that permits
these consequences by failing to adequately consider the rights of the
press and the public at the time a motion to seal is presented, fails to
serve the press, the public, and even the litigating parties. Hence, the
situation calls for special procedural protections to ensure that the
rights of the press and the public remain intact.
motion to seal the papers was made, Ryan could have handled the issue differently. Further,
empirical evidence suggests such a task would not overly burden the courts. Cook County,
which includes all of Chicago, had more than 191,000 domestic relations cases filed from 1999 to
2003. Chandler et al., supra note 2. Only thirty-two of these cases were sealed. Id.
188. This is the case in the Pritzker action. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. The
Chicago Tribune was disadvantaged by its inability to challenge the trial court's justification for
sealing the record because any findings contained in the sealing order were sealed with the rest
of the file. See A.P., 821 N.E.2d at 1244. ("The trial court orally required the Tribune to file its
briefs under seal and denied the Tribune's oral request for a copy of either the papers supporting
the motion to seal the files or the orders sealing the entire files."). The Appellate Court held
that the trial court's order, being a public document, should not be kept under seal: "Judicial
opinions are not the litigants' property; they belong to the public, which underwrites the judicial
system that produces them." Id. at 1248 (citing Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 46 F.3d 29, 31 (7th Cir.
1995)).
189. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994).
190. The Chicago Tribune moved to unseal the Pritzker record in March of 2004. See supra
note 186 and accompanying text. It was not until the very end of 2004 that the Illinois Appellate
Court reversed the sealing order. See A. P., 821 N.E.2d 1238. The spectacle created by this
sealing order has proven newsworthy in itself. See, e.g., Susan Chandler, Pritzkers Lose Bid to
Close Courtroom; Order Stayed While Family Mulls Appeal, CI. TRIB., Oct. 26, 2004, at C3. In
a less prominent case, the story could die and the public's First Amendment right to access
would be thus frustrated.
191. See, e.g., Grove Fresh, 24 F.3d at 897 (finding that the case was further complicated by the
parties' reliance on the sealing order to file "documents which otherwise would not be part of
the public record"); see also William F. Zieske, Your Court Documents Filed Under Seal: Will
They Stay Confidential?, 89 ILL. B.J. 572 (2001) (identifying the risks of a local rule in U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that permits public disclosure of documents
filed under seal up to twenty years ago).
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1. Looking for a Guide: The Procedural Protections of the Fourth
Amendment
The Bill of Rights creates another situation that presents similar
procedural problems. The Fourth Amendment guarantees rights to
society and to an accused suspect. Those rights are protected through
procedural guarantees that provide narrow exceptions to strong pre-
sumptions. 92 Using the Fourth Amendment's procedural protections
as a model, courts can help ensure that First Amendment access rights
are protected. 193 Applying a similar procedural framework when ex-
amining the First Amendment right of access will provide better pro-
tection to the press and the public-just as suspects and society are
protected in the Fourth Amendment context.
a. Parallel Procedural Frameworks: the Fourth Amendment Right
To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, and
the First Amendment Right of Access
When attempting to secure a warrant, a representative of the state
puts forth the case for search or arrest to a judge or magistrate. 194 The
suspect is absent, but the suspect's Fourth Amendment rights are
not. 195 The court must consider the facts as presented in light of pre-
192. Succinctly stated,
Thus the most basic constitutional rule in this area is that "searches conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically estab-
lished and well-delineated exceptions." The exceptions are "jealously and carefully
drawn," and there must be "a showing by those who seek exemption ... that the exi-
gencies of the situation made that course imperative." "[Tihe burden is on those seek-
ing the exemption to show the need for it." In times of unrest, whether caused by crime
or racial conflict or fear of internal subversion, this basic law and the values that it
represents may appear unrealistic or "extravagant" to some.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971) (internal citations omitted).
193. Some argue that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is no prize. See, e.g., Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759 (1994) (stating "Fourth
Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner-rudderless and badly off course"). But the bene-
fits of a workable system that assigns the responsibility of an explicit constitutional inquiry to the
court provides a more reliable and efficient process than otherwise employed-where all players
are disserved by a post hoc reversal of an unconstitutional sealing order.
194. The Supreme Court has recognized several times that a search arrant is prferred to
secure prior judicial approval of a search. See, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204,
211-22 (1981) (holding that absent exigent circumstances or consent, police cannot search for a
suspect named in an arrest warrant in the home of a third party without first obtaining a search
warrant). As the Court stated, "In routine search cases such as this, the short time required to
obtain a search warrant from a magistrate will seldom hinder efforts to apprehend a felon." Id.
at 222.
195. The Supreme Court has criticized magistrates who neglect their burden of protecting the
rights of the accused: "A magistrate failing to 'manifest [the] neutrality and detachment de-
manded of a judicial officer when presented with a warrant application' and who acts instead as
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cedent that protects the suspect's liberty interests and the public's
right to be safe. 196 Similarly, when an agreed order to seal the record
in a civil case is presented to a judge, the press is absent. 197 Despite
that absence, the First Amendment right of access for the press and
the public is no less potent. As in the Fourth Amendment context, the
court should undertake the constitutional burden of weighing the
rights of the press and public against the rights of the parties. Forget-
ting the defendant's rights when the state applies for a warrant consti-
tutes a clear constitutional violation. 198  Fourth Amendment
procedure is structured so that the defendant's rights are not ignored.
Using that structure as a guide will help protect the all too often for-
gotten rights of the press and the public when a motion to seal is
presented to the court.
i. Presumptions
The Fourth Amendment's emphasis on the suspect's rights is a re-
sult of the strong presumption that a search or seizure without a valid
warrant is unreasonable: "[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this
area is that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions. "199 If an arrest occurs without a war-
rant, it is the state's burden to justify that arrest-and it is a heavy
burden to meet.200
This is where the First Amendment right of access must start.
Given the "logic" and "experience" in favor of open judicial
records, 20 1 the records must enjoy a strong presumption of public ac-
cess. A challenge to that presumption must meet thoughtful and rea-
soned resistance. A rubber stamp is not acceptable in the Fourth
'an adjunct law enforcement officer' cannot provide valid authorization for an otherwise uncon-
stitutional search." United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v.
New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979)).
196. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
197. Dittrich v. Gibbs, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1570 (I11. Cir. Ct. 2002). The Chicago Tribune
intervened to unseal the record five years after the case settled. Id.
198. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
199. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 453, 454-55 (1971).
200. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. See also Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557
(2004). The Groh Court found a warrant invalid as lacking particularity because it did not suffi-
ciently list the evidence sought. Id. The fact that the underlying application did list this informa-
tion was of no avail. Id.
201. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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Amendment context,202 and such "rubber stamping" must not be ac-
ceptable in the access context.20 3 This is especially true because "the
influential and connected are well represented among the benefi-
ciaries" of sealed court files.204 A strong presumption of openness
gives the court a sound foundation from which to begin its considera-
tion of the merits.
ii. Exceptions
Equally important to the Fourth Amendment's functionality are the
exceptions.20 5 A rule that prevented all searches and seizures absent a
warrant would not stand. Society would neither tolerate nor enforce
such a mandate. Therefore, the courts have drawn clear exceptions to
the rules. 20 6 The exceptions are narrowly tailored to permit courts
and police officers to make efficient, correct decisions that maintain
an adequate balance between the competing rights of a suspect and of
society.
Similarly, a presumption that grants public access to every judicial
document would frustrate justice. 207 Litigants may avoid the courts in
favor of more primitive dispute resolution. 208 Therefore, narrow ex-
ceptions are necessary when drawing the proper balance between the
rights of private litigants and the First Amendment rights of the press
and the public.
Perhaps the best known exception to presumed open access in-
volves trade secrets. In certain circumstances, it is essential to the
continued success of a company that proprietary information remain
private. 20 9 For example, when a dispute arose over the secret formu-
202. The Court posited: "[C]ourts must also insist that the magistrate purport to 'perform his
neutral and detached function and not serve merely as a rubber stamp for the police."' United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984) (quoting Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964))
(some internal quotation marks omitted).
203. See A.P. v. M.E.E., 821 N.E.2d 1238, 1246 (Il. App. Ct. 2004) (citing Citizens First Nat'l
Bank of Princeton v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 1999)) ("The judge, as the pri-
mary representative of the public interest in the judicial process, should not rubber stamp a
stipulation to seal a record.").
204. See Rich & Altimari, supra note 179. Giving the court a strong presumption of access to
fall back on will help assure equality in such situations.
205. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
206. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
207. One court found: "First Amendment rights of the press are as much endangered by its
zealots as by its critics." Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.2d 805, 811 (R.I. 1996).
208. Showing the public the effectiveness of the judiciary brings "significant community thera-
peutic value" and serves a prophylactic purpose-preventing "some form of vengeful 'self-
help."' Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570-71 (1980).
209. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985) (find-
ing that recipes to cola drinks should be protected from public view).
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lae used to create various Coca-Cola products, the court permitted
discovery of the recipes but issued a strict protective order to keep the
formulae from competitors. 210 In such a situation, denying public ac-
cess to such information is justified.
There are other exceptions to open access. Recognition that un-
proven accusations should not be made public has led courts to keep
grand jury testimony from the public eye. 21' Similar considerations
have led courts to find constitutional justification for sealing allega-
tions in civil cases that have been stricken as immaterial. For exam-
ple, in a sexual assault case filed against the Catholic Church, the
court held that access to allegations previously stricken would only
serve to improperly prejudice the public and potential jurors.212
Where the right to a fair trial is implicated, judicial documents may be
sealed provided there are specific findings that access to documents
would prejudice the fair trial.21 3
Post-9/11 concerns for national security have prompted more judi-
cial deference to sealing orders in cases involving the attacks.214 Long
before 9/11, there was a law enforcement privilege that permitted cer-
tain information to be kept from the public to ensure effective
policing.21 5
210. See id. at 289-300 (advising limited disclosure of the formulae to plaintiffs' counsel and
independent experts).
211. See, e.g., In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 47 (1st Cir. 2004). Further, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require that records pertaining to grand jury proceedings be closed
or sealed to prevent disclosure of matters occurring before a grand jury. FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(e)(3). Ancillary proceedings are similarly kept secret. In re Motions of Dow Jones & Co., 142
F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding no First Amendment right of access to ancillary proceedings
regarding Monica Lewinsky). Interestingly, Arizona courts recognized an exception to this rule
and released the grand jury testimony of the state governor who had been subpoenaed while
simultaneously facing a recall election and impeachment proceedings. Arizona v. Mecham, 15
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2151 (Ariz. Superior Court 1988).
212. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, 92 S.W.3d 724 (Ky. 2002).
213. Associated Press v. United States Dist. Ct., 705 F.2d 1143 (9th Cir. 1983) (finding a blan-
ket sealing order unconstitutional on the ground that the trial court did not make specific find-
ings that access to documents would prejudice fair trials).
214. The Supreme Court recently denied certiorari to review access questions raised in terror-
ism cases after the Eleventh Circuit kept one such case, M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004),
under a veil of secrecy. See Paul M. Smith et al., Court Denies Cert in Key First Amendment
Cases, 21 COMM. LAWYER 29 (2004). All that is known of the case is that it involves an "Alge-
rian-born waiter in Florida who was detained for five months after the September 11, 2001 at-
tacks." Id. Any order giving reasons for sealing is sealed. Id.
215. The law enforcement privilege is designed to "prevent disclosure of law enforcement
techniques and procedures." See, e.g., In re Dep't of Investigation, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir.
1988). It also operates to "preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law
enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and
to otherwise prevent interference with an investigation." Id.
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Privacy rights also raise special considerations. For example, courts
have recognized a compelling interest in sealing adoption files216 and
in protecting the anonymity of juvenile offenders.2 17
The right to privacy is not a free pass. After Ted Kaczynski pled
guilty to the "Unabomber" crimes, the media moved to unseal his psy-
chiatric exam.2 18 After redacting information regarding people "not
before the court," the documents were unsealed. 219 Nor have victims
of sexual abuse enjoyed an exception to the access presumption,220
though many courts recognize the propriety of withholding a victim's
name.221 Protection of the right to access has been extended, how-
ever, when judicial documents are used for improper purposes, such
as "to gratify private spite or promote public scandal. '222
These exceptions are justifiable on policy grounds. As in the Fourth
Amendment context, balances must be drawn.223 We must protect the
rights of suspected criminals, or those rights will quickly disappear for
the rest of us. But absolutism is not the answer. Forbidding police
from performing a "pat down" to ensure their personal safety would
achieve the goal of protecting suspected criminals but would reduce
the security of the public. Such a rule could deter people from becom-
ing police officers because of the personal danger that such a rule
would impose. Terry v. Ohio drew the balance. 224 Similarly, the First
Amendment right of access is essential to ensure the fairness and
proper functioning of the judiciary. But putting Coca-Cola out of bus-
iness to achieve that goal would do much more social harm than any
216. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. Rptr. 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (recognizing
the right of a minor to keep an adoption record sealed and relying on the state's strong presump-
tion of closure).
217. Pack v. Kings County Human Servs. Agency, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 594, 600 (Cal. Ct. App.
2001).
218. United States v. Kaczynski, 154 F.3d 930, 931 (9th Cir. 1998) (relying on common-law
right of access). Kaczynski was a Harvard graduate turned recluse who pleaded guilty to a string
of bombings that killed three and injured twenty-three. See Kaczynski Seeks to Overturn Con-
viction, WASH. POST, June 17, 1999, at A25.
219. Kaczynski, 154 F.3d at 932.
220. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1982) (finding a Massa-
chusetts statute, aimed at protecting young rape victims from further trauma and embarrassment
by preventing public access to their testimony, not sufficiently compelling or narrowly tailored to
override First Amendment right of access to courtroom).
221. See, e.g., People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 629-31 (Colo. 2004) (discussing the social justifi-
cations for keeping rape victims from the public spotlight).
222. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (citing In re Caswell, 29 A. 259
(R.I. 1893)).
223. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
224. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968) (holding that an officer may constitutionally "pat
down" an individual whom he has reasonable suspicion "is armed and presently dangerous to
the officer or to others").
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benefit that could be expected by unsealing the formula for Diet
Coke.
2. Moving Beyond the Fourth Amendment
Trade secret and malicious prosecution cases are easy. Efficiency is
served by drawing narrow categories. Such categories permit quick
application of the clear exceptions. Yet blind adherence to the catego-
ries can promote abuse. 225 More difficulty comes when there are gray
areas. Methods of analyzing these tougher questions are appropri-
ately drawn from other First Amendment precedents. 226 Any denial
of the First Amendment right of access must be examined under strict
scrutiny. It must be "necessitated by a compelling government inter-
est and narrowly tailored to serve that interest. '227
What satisfies that burden has challenged courts since the adoption
of the test.228 Because it is impossible to create categories for every
potential situation, ad hoc consideration is unavoidable. 229 The bur-
den falls on the trial court to meticulously consider justifications for
exclusion. 230 Broad sealing orders will not do.231 Rather, "it is proper
for a district court, after weighing competing interests, to edit and re-
dact a judicial document in order to allow access to appropriate por-
tions of the document .... -232 Indeed, "[T]he First Amendment
requires consideration of the feasibility of redaction on a document-
by-document basis .... "233 To ensure that these high benchmarks are
met, further procedural protections beyond those modeled on the
Fourth Amendment are required. Additional protections should en-
sure that the press and the public have the opportunity to review a
225. For example, in the criminal prosecutions against Michael Jackson and Kobe Bryant, the
parties "have taken advantage of the sexual assault allegations before them to stash reams of
unrelated information that should be public." See Gibeaut, supra note 5.
226. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (finding regulation that
restricted hate speech unconstitutional because while it served a compelling state interest, it was
not sufficiently narrowly tailored).
227. Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988).
228. See generally Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972).
229. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982).
230. The Seventh Circuit has shifted this burden to counsel. "[Tlhe court will in the future
deny outright any motion [to seal] that does not analyze in detail, document by document, the
propriety of secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations." Baxter Int'l, Inc. v. Abbott Labs.,
297 F.3d 544. 548 (7th Cir. 2002).
231. United States v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting "wholesale sealing" of
documents).
232. United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 1995).
233. In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2002).
1094 [Vol. 55:1067
SEALING CIVIL COURT DOCUMENTS
court's finding of a "compelling interest" and to challenge it if
necessary.
a. Notice
Before the media can challenge a sealing order, they must know it
exists. This basic principle is critical to ensure that the press and the
public are "given an opportunity to be heard on the question of their
exclusion. ' 234 Notice is essential to protect the First Amendment
right of access. For example, "the ability of the public and press to
attend civil and criminal cases would be merely theoretical if the infor-
mation provided by docket sheets were inaccessible.
23 5
Docketing any hearing regarding the potential sealing of a record
will provide that essential notice. But because the potential for favor-
itism and abuse exists, 236 docketing is not enough. Upcoming motions
regarding the sealing of a file should be posted by the clerk to ensure
that the press has adequate notice of such proceedings. 237 Otherwise,
if the press misses the brief window where such a case may be listed, it
could be lost forever. Indeed, it was only when a clerk inadvertently
listed the case of M.K.B. 238 on the oral argument calendar that the
public learned of the intensely secretive case. All that is known of the
case is that it involves an "Algerian-born waiter in Florida who was
detained for five months after the September 11, 2001, attacks. 239
Posting a list of motions to seal the record will have the added benefit
of accountability. Even if the hearing is attended merely out of curi-
osity, having an audience can ensure proper results. After all,
"[s]unshine is the best disinfectant. 24 °
b. A Detailed and Unsealed Sealing Order
The second critical piece to effectively protect the First Amendment
right of access involves orders that seal a file. The Richmond Newspa-
pers Court held that "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public. 2 41 If
234. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608 n.25 (quoting Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S.
368, 401 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
235. Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 831 (2d Cir. 2004).
236. See Rich & Altimari, supra note 179.
237. Contra United States v. Hailer, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding the docketing of a
sealing hearing sufficient for effective notice to the public that it may occur).
238. See Smith et al., supra note 214.
239. Id.
240. Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
241. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) (emphasis added).
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the media only become aware of a case after the record is already
sealed, it is imperative that they understand the nature of the closure
order. It is impossible to know whether a file is constitutionally sealed
if the order sealing the file is also sealed. Therefore, whenever "a
court finds that the presumption of access has been rebutted by some
countervailing interest, that 'interest is to be articulated along with
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether
the closure order was properly entered."' 242 These orders must re-
main open for review by the press and the public.243 The combination
of notice with a clear demonstration of judicial action will provide the
press with the tools necessary to monitor "the administration of jus-
tice on behalf of the public .... ",244
IV. IMPACT UPON THE COURTS: PROPER PROTECTION OF THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT OF ACCESS
This Part discusses the burden the procedures suggested above will
place on the judiciary.2 45 The Part concludes with a discussion of how
to share the burden so that the public's constitutional rights are pro-
tected, without overwhelming courts.246
A. The Burden on the Courts
There are significant benefits to a framework that protects the pub-
lic's First Amendment right to access judicial documents. The proce-
dures set forth above place a significant burden on the judiciary. But
the cost of failing to enforce the right of access is greater than the
increased burden on judges: "Nothing can destroy a government
more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
242. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 898 (7th Cir. 1994) (quot-
ing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise 1), 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)).
243. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. The Tribune could be litigating a clearly
losing battle. Perhaps the file only contains the business plan for Hyatt Hotels. This would pre-
sent a clear exception to the presumption of access (business records) and would be a waste of
the Tribune's time and money. The Tribune, however, does not know if this is the case because
the order sealing the Pritzker file is sealed. See A.P. v. M.E.E., 821 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (Il. App.
Ct. 2004) ("The trial court orally required the Tribune to file its briefs under seal and denied the
Tribune's oral request for a copy of either the papers supporting the motion to seal the files or
the orders sealing the entire files."). The Appellate Court reversed and remanded-keeping the
entire file sealed. Id. at 1253. "We return the circuit court record to the trial court in its sealed
condition so that the trial court may determine the most expeditious procedure for identifying
and sealing particular documents." Id. at 1252.
244. Brian W. v. Superior Court, 574 P.2d 788, 793 (Cal. 1978).
245. See infra notes 247-268 and accompanying text.
246. See infra notes 269-272 and accompanying text.
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disregard of the character of its own existence. ' 247 Judge William J.
Bauer, writing for the. Seventh Circuit, set forth the strict scrutiny
analysis required under the First Amendment, stating:
We sympathize with the burdens placed on trial judges today.
Nevertheless, where the rights of the litigants come into conflict
with the rights of the media and public at large, the trial judge's
responsibilities are heightened. In such instances, the litigants' pur-
ported interest in confidentiality must be scrutinized heavily.248
It is imperative that the court undertake the onerous burden of careful
review of documents that may be sealed. While the burden is "height-
ened," as Judge Bauer notes, 249 it is manageable.
Five years after the settlement of a civil case involving alleged sex-
ual assaults, an Illinois court was faced with a motion by the Chicago
Tribune to unseal the case file.2 50 The case involved the alleged sexual
assaults of minors by Catholic priests. 25' Broad protective orders
were entered while the case was pending in order to protect the vic-
tims, their parents, and priests whose names surfaced during discovery
but who were not charged with any wrongdoing. 252 The court recog-
nized that "absent a compelling interest to the contrary, the pleadings
and exhibits should be fully disclosed. ' 253 The court proceeded to re-
view the file in camera, document-by-document, and articulated de-
tailed findings about what should be open and what should remain
sealed.2 54 The court's findings are instructive:
The contents [of the first sealed envelope] are as follows:
1. Motion to Amend Complaint-This document containing two
pages is ordered unsealed and turned over to intervener and all
members of the public.
2. Exhibit B-Plaintiffs Memorandum containing 10 pages is or-
dered unsealed and turned over to intervener and released to the
public-however with certain redactions. Specifically, the Court will
redact paragraph 4, page 5 containing results of a phone interview
with two psychologists from Gibbs personnel file. The Court opines
that these are mental health records and should not be disclosed.
The Court will redact paragraph 7 on page 5 and 6 containing refer-
ences to a MMPI evaluation, also a Mental Health Record that the
Court opines should not be disclosed. The Court also redacts para-
247. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (recognizing the importance of proper applica-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights).
248. Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 899 (7th Cir. 1994).
249. Id.
250. Dittrich v. Gibbs, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1570, 1571 (I11. Cir. Ct. 2002).
251. Id.
252. Id.




graph 8 relating to psychological records as Mental Health Records.
On Page 7, Paragraph B, the Court redacts the name of the parents
and victim in subparagraph 1. This paragraph relates to an allega-
tion at St James the Apostle Church in Glen Ellyn involving Law-
rence Gibbs in 1977.255
The court reviewed every document under consideration in a de-
tailed manner-page by page. 256 It started with a strong presumption
of access. 257 When it recognized that certain information contained in
the record met the "compelling" standard, the court gave specific find-
ings, using the least restrictive means possible.258 Paragraphs and
words were kept from the public instead of the entire file.259 The or-
der specified the type of information withheld, giving the press and
the appellate court a clear picture of the court's reasoning.260
Finding one document that listed a number of priests who were not
in any way involved in the litigation, except being in the same Diocese
as those involved in the suit, the court made similarly justified
findings:
The Court is of the opinion that the disclosure of such a list would
have tremendous potential to harm the reputations and careers of
the individuals on the list who have not been charged with anything.
The Court sees nothing about such a list that would in any way ad-
vance the public debate on this sensitive issue. 261
Faced with a concept that does not easily fit into one of the catego-
ries set forth above, the court articulated the compelling interest in
keeping the list closed.262 The detailed order gives the press an under-
standing of exactly what was sealed. 263 The details and justifications
provide the public with a sense of confidence that the issues were con-
sidered and nothing is being "hidden." The appellate court has a suc-
255. Id. at 1572-73.
256. Dittrich, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1572-74.
257. Id. at 1572.
258. Id. at 1572-74.
259. Id. at 1574. See also A.P. v. M.E.E., 821 N.E.2d 1238 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004). In the Pritzker
case, the court suggested that
redacting the names of the adult and minor beneficiaries could serve to protect the
minors' privacy interests without resorting to the overly broad measure of sealing the
entire documents or concealing the identities of other adult parties. On remand, the
trial court may determine that protection of the minor and unborn beneficiaries may
warrant the use of initials or pseudonyms by the minor and adult beneficiaries.
Id. at 1253.
260. Dittrich, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1572-74.
261. Id. at 1574.
262. Id.
263. See id. at 1572-74.
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cinct issue for review if the matter is appealed. 264 This type of review
is a model for what should take place when documents affected by a
sealing order are filed. Performing the inquiry early in the process is
more judicially efficient because the court need not relitigate the is-
sues five years down the line.2 65 Further, an early order governing
what stays public and what is sealed prevents potential harm the par-
ties may suffer by relying on a broad sealing order.2 66
Another approach is to put more responsibility on counsel for the
parties. If the court sets standards for a party who seeks to seal a
record, the court can facilitate the review process. Writing for the
Seventh Circuit, Judge Frank H. Easterbrook warned counsel that
"the court will in the future deny outright any motion [to seal] that
does not analyze in detail, document by document, the propriety of
secrecy, providing reasons and legal citations. ' 267 The court also re-
quested that counsel "pare down" the record, because only documents
filed with the court were entitled to the strong presumption of open-
ness.268 In other words, pick your battles. Only file a sensitive docu-
ment if it is necessary to the case. Only ask the court to seal
documents when privacy is essential.
B. The Answer
Some have advocated for local rules to assure clear, effective notice
to counsel who desire to seal a record.269 Such rules are good places
to start in articulating the basic First Amendment access analysis. But
264. See A.P., 821 N.E.2d at 1247. The Appellate Court articulated its agreement with the
trial court that private matters involving minors and family finances should be sealed. Id. But
the court remanded to the lower court because "without specific findings, [the court] cannot
adequately review whether the blanket application of those propositions justified sealing the
court files in this case." Id. The court highlighted the importance of a detailed sealing order:
"Adequate findings relieve the appellate court of having to grope through the record to deter-
mine whether some combination of credible evidentiary items could support some line of factual
and legal conclusions that would support the trial court's ultimate decision." Id. at 1247-48.
265. See Dittrich, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1570.
266. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir.
1994). In Grove Fresh, the parties were harmed because "[in reliance on the seal, [they] had
filed documents which otherwise would not be part of the public record." Id.
e297I a .3o 54, 548 (7th Cir. 2002).24 ,. Baxt r .......In  v. Abboat L bs., 
268. Id.
269. Bechamps, supra note 138, at 144-45 (1990). Bechamps's model statute reads as follows:
(1) All documents filed with the court are public records and available for inspection
unless access is limited by statute or by court order entered according to the procedures
set forth below.
(2) Upon the entry of a final judgment or consent decree, any party to a civil action
may move to seal specific documents or portions thereof contained in the court records.
(3) Before limiting access to court records, the court shall give notice to all parties and
interested third parties and shall hold a hearing on the motion. The court shall not seal
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procedural problems inherent in an adversarial process are still pre-
sent-at least when the press is not a party. Thus, it is imperative that
the procedural protections set forth above are also implemented and
respected to protect the right of access.
To ensure proper constitutional protection, courts should adopt
some combination of all of the approaches listed above. A local rule
may be the best vehicle to inform attorneys and judges of the proper
access standards. 270 Aside from setting forth a presumption of open-
ness and narrow categories of exclusion, however, the rule must also
place responsibility on counsel to perform the type of review Judge
Easterbrook advocated in Baxter v. International, Inc. v. Abbott Labo-
ratories.2 71 This does not remove all responsibility from the court.
Even with a fully briefed motion to seal, the court still has a responsi-
bility to keep from the public only that which is necessary, using the
least restrictive means. Thus, the rule should specify the court's duty
to perform a document-by-document review that results in specific,
clearly articulated findings, as in Dittrich.272 This combination of con-
stitutional and procedural protections will give courts a clear frame-
work with which to analyze sealing issues. Further, it presents
adequate protections to ensure the press's ability to challenge a seal-
ing order.
V. CONCLUSION
The goals of access are important to ensure the effective operation
of our democratic society. An open trial assures that "the proceedings
were conducted fairly to all .... "273 Open court records serve as a
check on judicial power, and build confidence in the judicial pro-
court records except upon finding that the moving party has proved by clear and con-
vincing evidence that information contained in the document sought to be sealed:
(a) constitutes a trade secret or other confidential commercial research or
information;
(b) is a matter of national security;
(c) promotes scandal or defamation;
(d) pertains to wholly private family matters, such as divorce, child custody, or
adoption;
(e) poses a serious threat of harassment, exploitation, physical intrusion, or other
particularized harm to the parties to the action; or
(f) poses the potential for harm to third persons not parties to the litigation.
(4) The sealing order shall specify the documents to be sealed, the reasons for sealing,
and the duration of the order.
Id.
270. See id.
271. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
272. Dittrich v. Gibbs, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1570, 1572-74 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2002).
273. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980).
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cess. 274 Further, showing the public the judiciary's effectiveness
brings "significant community therapeutic value ' 275 and serves a pro-
phylactic purpose-preventing "some form of vengeful 'self-help.' "276
Courts have relied on these goals to extend the First Amendment
right of access from criminal proceedings to civil documents.
Ensuring the effective protection of that right is difficult because
the nature of the adversary process leaves the press and the public as
forgotten stakeholders. The Fourth Amendment presents similar pro-
cedural problems regarding a suspect's rights. Using the procedural
protections developed in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts
can protect the First Amendment right of access. Beyond those basic
protections, courts must assure adequate notice to the press and the
public before a record is sealed. If documents are sealed, the court
must make specific findings to give the press sufficient knowledge of
the matters withheld from the public, and to give the reviewing court a
sufficient basis on which to reconsider the sealing. A local rule incor-
porating all these elements may be the best way to notify judges and
attorneys of the proper procedure to ensure protection of the First
Amendment right of access.
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274. Id. at 570.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted).
* DePaul University College of Law, J.D. candidate, 2006. Special thanks to Jorie Zlotnik
for constant support, to Bill Coulson for thoughtful discussion, and to Jack Zlotnik for careful
review.
20061 1101
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:10671102
